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REVIEWS
Marc Lange. Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics,
and the Laws of Nature. xvi + 257 pp. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009.∗
Christopher Belanger†
In Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of
Nature, Marc Lange has presented an engagingly written, tightly argued,
and novel philosophical account of the laws of nature. One of the intuitions
behind the notion of a law of nature is, roughly, that of the many regularities
we observe in the world there are some which appear to be due to
mere happen-stance (“accidental” regularities, in the philosopher’s jargon),
while others, which we call “laws,” seem to be possessed of a degree of
necessity. For example, if the only music ever to come out of my stereo
system during the entirety of its existence were that of James Brown,
we would term this an accidental regularity: it seems that it could have
been otherwise had the world been different, perhaps by the stereo having
a different owner or my having different tastes. On the other hand, the
various relations and properties that determine the electrical functioning
of my stereo seem more necessary and lawlike: presumably Ohm’s law
would have held even had my stereo never been built.1 But even if Ohm’s
law is somehow necessary, it seems less necessary than other “broadly
logical” truths. Certainly Ohm’s law could have been different, perhaps
by a factor of two, yet it seems unreasonable to say that the number
6 could have been prime. Although many philosophers, and certainly
most scientists, will readily agree that there is a difference between
logical, law-like, and accidental regularities, spelling out the nature of this
difference has proved a remarkably difficult task. It is precisely this puzzle
which Lange intends Laws and Lawmakers to address. In this review I shall
first give a quick and broad outline of Lange’s account of natural laws as
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1 “Ohm’s law” is the name given to a particular relation between voltage, current, and
resistance. Although this relation is called a law, by referring to it as such I do not wish
to beg the question of its lawhood.
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I understand it, followed by a brief summary of the contents of the book,
and then close with a few critical comments.
Lange’s account is ontologically and metaphysically “thick,” in that laws
are real elements of the universe independent of what we know or think
of them at any point in time. This sets Lange’s position in opposition to
many of the popular deflationary accounts of laws, in which laws are
seen as elegant yet strictly false summaries of knowledge, propositions
which best summarize contingent yet unnecessary regularities in nature,
or otherwise somehow more closely akin to human constructions than
real elements of the world. One of Lange’s major claims is that we can
come to know the laws of nature through logical analysis, since they
can be identified in a non ad-hoc way as exactly those truths belonging
to sets with particular logical properties. This is not to say that Lange
is embracing a completely rationalist account of laws, since presumably
which propositions are true of nature can only be determined through
empirical means. Lange’s analysis relies heavily on counterfactuals and
modal logic. Although he does briefly introduce both of these concepts,
readers should be aware that he assumes a degree of familiarity with them.
Lange begins with the observation that counterfactuals whose
consequents involve laws seem to preserve their truth values under a
wider range of antecedents than those involving mere accidents. Consider
the antecedent “Had the world exploded at 9:02am...,” which renders false
a large number of counterfactuals involving accidental facts (“...you would
still be reading this review”) but seems to leave untouched those involving
laws (“...Ohm’s law would still have held”). Of course, the antecedent “Had
Ohm’s law not been a law...” renders false most counterfactuals involving
Ohm’s law, but this seems qualitatively different from the previous example:
while the first antecedent concerns facts, the latter antecedent concerns
a fact about facts. Based on this observation, Lange develops the idea
of a hierarchy of facts, each level of which constrains (or “governs”), but
does not exhaustively determine, the level below it (p. 18). On the bottom
level sit the sub-nomic facts, which are facts about nature which contain no
nomic terms and do not ‘boss around’ any other facts (e.g. “In this circuit
voltage equals current times resistance”). Above them sit the nomic facts,
which constrain the sub-nomic facts (e.g. “It is a law that in this circuit
voltage equals current times resistance”). Above the nomic facts there sits
another layer of meta-laws such as symmetry principles, which constrain
the nomic facts, and so on. Lange declines to place an upper limit on this
hierarchy, deferring to science to tell us where it ends (p. 19).
Lange’s proposed definition of lawhood hinges on the notion of
“sub-nomic stability.” Informally, a set of sub-nomic truths is sub-nomically
stable “if and only if whatever the conversational context, the set’s
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members would all still have held under every sub-nomic counterfactual
(or subjunctive) supposition that is logically consistent with the set” (p. 29).
Sub-nomic stability thus captures the preservation under counterfactuals
that was outlined above, while at the same time ruling out the sorts
of law-laden, and therefore not sub-nomic, antecedents that caused
problems. Lange’s major claim is that the set of first-order laws, which he
calls “Λ,” is the largest non-maximal sub-nomically stable set. Furthermore,
for a truth to possess a certain kind of necessity, in other words for a truth
to be a law, is just to belong to such a non-maximal sub-nomically stable
set (p. 46).
This is a difficult concept, and the remainder of the book is dedicated
to the elaboration, exploration, and defense of the idea. In chapter 2,
Lange argues that the concept of sub-nomic stability can be extended
to apply to any level of the hierarchy of facts, at each stage generating
a more exclusive and necessary set of laws. Lange’s account thus
provides an uncontrived explanation of the different varieties of necessity
possessed by different sorts of facts, from totally unnecessary accidents,
to sort-of necessary natural laws, to very necessary logical truths. In
chapter 3 Lange develops some further advantages of his account.
First, it allows a tidy explanation of why the laws must be immutable,
or valid for all times and in all places. Second, it extends naturally to
meta-laws, such as symmetry principles, which are laws governing other
laws. Finally, Lange’s account also deals naturally with the relationship
between chancy facts and deterministic laws, something which previous
accounts of natural law–in particular David Lewis’s Best System account
and David Armstrong’s theory of metaphysically necessary relations
among universals–could account for only through ad hoc tweaking (p.
122). The fourth and final chapter outlines one of the most interesting,
and certainly most controversial, suggestions in the book, which is that
subjunctive facts constitute the “ontological bedrock” of the world (p. 136).
That is, subjunctive facts are the lawmakers: rather than laws supporting
counterfactuals, as is often assumed, the situation is quite the reverse.
Although a fuller discussion of this point is impossible here, I have no doubt
that it will inspire a lively debate.
Lange’s arguments are meticulous in their detail, and he takes great
pains to identify and meet possible objections. However, as with all
metaphysics, one’s prior sensibilities will colour one’s reception of some of
his arguments. For example, those who favour parsimony in nature may be
alarmed to learn that if m is a law, then all logical consequences of m are
also laws, and thus Λ must be a very large set indeed (p. 16). Even beyond
simplicity considerations, defining conjunctions of laws as themselves laws
makes it difficult to see how laws could be confirmed by their positive
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instances. If the conjunct of two totally unrelated laws, say one concerning
cows and one concerning uranium, is also considered a law, some have
argued that it is difficult to see how observation of a compatible cow
should lend confirmational support to the claim about uranium (cf., for
example, Maudlin The Metaphysics Within Physics [Oxford 2007], 35-36).
This is not a decisive counterargument in the least, but it does raise
interesting questions about laws and confirmation on Lange’s account.
In my estimation the book contains at least one weak argument, which
is also the last. Lange proposes a reductio to prove that the laws of
nature must not have any “gaps” in them, or leave the outcome of any
event totally unspecified (p. 181-88). Space and format prohibit a fuller
discussion here, but there is evidence that Lange himself considers the
argument somewhat incomplete, particularly since the end notes contain
a summary of an apparently unpublished debate on the subject between
him and John Carroll. Still, in his own words, Lange has never been afraid
to stick his neck out, and if the book ends on a slightly uncertain note that
should only serve as encouragement that there is yet more work to be
done.
Those familiar with Lange’s previous work, and in particular with his
Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics, should have gathered that
Laws and Lawmakers is very different in both tone and intent. Although
Lange is a patient and gifted communicator, this book is not meant
to serve as an introduction to the philosophical literature on laws of
nature. Rather, it is a focussed and technical argument for Lange’s own
position and, as such, other philosophical accounts of nature’s laws
enter the picture only as foils for his own proposal. It is thus somewhat
strange that the book’s back jacket indicates that it is targeted not only
at professional and aspiring philosophers, but also at “undergraduate
scientists interested in the logical foundations of science.” It is certainly
not my intent to deter any potential readers, but they should be warned
that at least some philosophical training and familiarity with modal logic
are highly recommended. Notwithstanding these caveats, those with the
background and the interest will find Laws and Lawmakers a fascinating
and challenging read, certain to advance the debate over the laws of
nature.
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